True story of "Anna of Kyiv": SBI launches investigation into formation of 155th Brigade

The case is under the control of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief V. Zelenskyy, Defence Minister R. Umierov, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces O. Syrskyi. One of the leaders responsible for the brigade’s formation died of a heart attack, and the brigade commander was dismissed immediately after the brigade entered combat. Before the brigade fired its first shot, 1,700 servicemen deserted. Investigators from the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) were tasked with finding those responsible. I conducted an investigation and gathered a substantial amount of evidence and testimonies to show the public the consequences of forming new brigades like the 140th, 150th, and even 160th from scratch, without proper command staff, technical specialists, weapons, or drones. This is indeed a crime—but not the crime of soldiers and officers. It is the crime of the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff, the Ministry of Defence, and the General Staff, who continue to waste lives and state resources on new projects instead of strengthening experienced and battle-ready brigades. They are now attempting to absolve themselves of responsibility by shifting the blame onto officers trapped in an impossible situation, forced to take responsibility for a poorly organized political project by the higher leadership.

1. Criminal case

The reason for the SBI case was the events in France, where the 155th Anna of Kyiv Brigade was sent for training. The project holds the highest political priority, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy devised a plan for Ukraine's NATO allies to form 14 new brigades, for which Ukraine must find people, while our partners are to provide the weapons. According to estimates by the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, the cost of forming one such brigade was around 900 million euros, though this was not intended to be in cash, 80% of the cost was to come in the form of heavy weapons—tanks, armoured vehicles, and artillery—that the allies were expected to either supply from their stockpiles or manufacture anew. The first project of this kind was the 155th Separate Mechanised Brigade, announced personally by President Macron. France fully met all the obligations for arming and training the brigade as requested by the Ukrainians. However, during the training phase, more than 50 soldiers deserted from the new brigade in France. This raised concerns among the French leadership regarding the seriousness of the Ukrainians’ commitment to executing such an expensive project. This approach seriously discredited Zelenskyy’s entire plan, leading to a scandal that was brought up at the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, after which the SBI opened a criminal case. The key question that the SBI sent to the Army Command on December 10 was whether the General Staff and the Command of the Ground Forces (CGF) orders contained any warnings regarding mobilized servicemen who should not be recommended as candidates for training in France. The SBI is investigating Zelenskyy's main question —who is to be held accountable for the soldiers’ desertion in France? However, the investigation fails to recognize that the events in France were inevitable, as this chaos had been predetermined.

2. The first stage: People

The 155th Brigade began to form in March 2024. An experienced officer, Dmytro Riumshyn, was appointed as its commander, which seemed encouraging. The Operational Command (OC) "West" was responsible for the formation and manning of the brigade, with General Shvediuk as Commander, Colonel Seletskyi as Chief of Staff, and General Pavliuk as Commander of the Ground Forces.

But from the very beginning, it turned out that the OC "West" had neither the command staff, nor the soldiers, nor the weapons, nor the resources to create a new unit. The formation of the 155th Brigade from the very first days was complete organizational chaos in literally all components, and the service required great efforts from those who tried to serve honestly and resulted in great losses due to AWOL from the very beginning of the formation.

Here is the manning schedule of the 155th Brigade, the number of military personnel (MP) before they went to the front for each month, and the number of AWOL сases in brackets for that month:

MP (AWOL)

March 46 (3)

April 123 (6)

May 217 (31)

June 1978 (185)

July 3882 (310)

August 2748 (217)

September 3253 (187)

October 3211 (339)

November 5832 (448).

The 155th Brigade left for training in France in October, and at that time there were already 935 AWOL incidents in the brigade! In other words, the command of the OC "West" and the Army Command, those who sent the brigade, could not have failed to understand all the scandalous consequences and that there would be AWOL even in France.

In fact, the manning of the brigade began in June, but they didn’t have time to undergo full training, as in July and August, more than 2,550 soldiers were taken from the 155th Brigade to reinforce other units!

In other words, they took away almost all of the fully fit soldiers who had just been appointed by the brigade commander and battalion commanders, actually resetting the previous four months of work, in March-June, so that this brigade was organized in August, and then... they issued an order for everyone who remained to prepare for the trip to France at the end of September.

As a result, 1924 servicemen were sent to France as part of the 155th Brigade, of whom only 51 had more than a year of military service, 459 had up to a year of experience, and the majority, 1414, had just enlisted and served for less than 2 months. Particularly problematic were about 150 people who had just been recruited without any selection and were sent to France without even passing the BGMT (basic general military training)! Among them was the highest number of deserters, with a total of about 50 soldiers from the brigade fleeing in France.

In other words, the Army Command and OC "West" sent to France not an organized and manageable military unit that could learn a lot, but a crowd of people who had just put on military uniforms, about 30% of the staff, who were supposed to organize and get to know each other and their commanders during the trip!

While the entire brigade command was in France for training, thousands of new men were enrolled without the presence of brigade and battalion commanders, resulting in more than 700 people deserting the brigade in October and November in Ukraine immediately after enlistment. They went AWOL without ever seeing their commanders.

Nevertheless, most of the soldiers who were sent to France did not desert but were preparing. Neither did more than 4,000 people recruited without selection from the TCR (Territorial Centres of Recruitment), who came to replenish the brigade in September-November, who, in the absence of the brigade command and the home station, lived on the territory of the OC "West" training center and were somehow trained by the instructors sent there by the OC.

On November 15, the brigade's enlisted personnel began to return to Ukraine, while the brigade headquarters stayed behind as per the training plan to complete staff exercises, for which the French instructors gave the highest marks. The brigade headquarters arrived in Ukraine on November 30, but Brigadier Riumshyn did not have time to get acquainted with his new 4,000 subordinates who were waiting at the training center or to conduct the planned additional training with those who had not received all the necessary instruction. In the absence of the brigade headquarters and battalion commanders, OC "West" and the CGF began to transfer untrained and uncoordinated personnel to the Pokrovsk area.

Immediately after Brigadier Riumshyn arrived in Pokrovsk from France, during the deployment of the brigade, on December 4, a CGF commission visited the brigade and quickly wrote a conclusion that the brigade commander, who allegedly did not spend time communicating with the personnel, was to blame for the desertion of 50 soldiers in France, and that is why they ran away! In a few days, Brigade Commander Riumshyn, who had just managed to create some minimal controllability in this chaos and tried to save the situation, was removed from his post, several staff officers and one of the battalion commanders were also removed, and new commanders were appointed who had no understanding of the state of affairs in the brigade. As a result, the chaos in management only intensified, controllability became much worse, and in the first week of December, even before entering combat, the brigade had another 198 incidents of AWOL, and from the first day of combat missions, significant losses of personnel began due to poor controllability and training.

3. Organisation and preparation

"People were provided just to meet the staffing percentage, purely as a formality, those who had been initially trained were taken away, new ones were brought in, but they weren’t given the opportunity to train for specific positions, nor were they given time to organize training according to their specialties," said one of the brigade officers in a commentary.

95% of the brigade's commanders had not fought in the war and needed extensive training and selection before they could be trusted with command. 100% of the brigade's technical specialists had to be trained from scratch—for drones, equipment, and management—and there was no time to shape them into proper specialists.

The second problem was the constant changes in staffing, which made it impossible to assign and train people in their roles.

Over the past 9 months, the 155th Brigade has actually seen 7 changes in staff:

- The staff of the infantry brigade of 6 rifle battalions as of March 2024;

- The staff of the infantry brigade as of August 2024, after most of the personnel were taken from the brigade to replenish other units;

- The staff of the mechanized brigade consisting of 3 mechanized and 3 rifle battalions, a battalion of UASs (unmanned aircraft systems), a tank battalion, a Caesar division, and an EW company in August;

- The brigade staff that went to France for training in September - all those who were available at that time were transferred to other positions due to a shortage of people, so the specialists of the EW and UASs companies were sent to infantry positions to cover the shortage and did not receive training in their specialties;

- The brigade's staffing after returning to France in November—due to the replenishment of the brigade with 4,000 people, it was necessary to integrate them into all units and provide them with professional training, which required transferring personnel again, including those who had already served, reassigning to other positions some of those who had trained outside their specialty, and sending several hundred newly recruited soldiers to training centers.

- The staff of the brigade, which was without a brigade command, was sent to the front from those who were in the training centre of OC "West"  in late November;

- The staff of the brigade, which Riumshyn began to assemble from existing people near Pokrovsk after returning from France, was to be used for combat missions in December.

Since the brigade's headquarters was based in France, the quality of training for most of the personnel stationed at the OC "West" training center was poor. A poorly organized and poorly managed unit cannot be effectively trained. This was confirmed by several instructors from the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, who were engaged by OC "West" to conduct combat training.

In addition, the quality of training in many specialties, especially for UAV operators, was very low. In fact, all the people appointed to the positions of technical specialists were not ready for immediate duty and needed additional selection and training in combat units to gain real combat capability. The brigade was only able to do this training after being put into combat.

4. Armament

The brigade's staffing plan provided for more than 150 drones, including 137 Mavic-3s. This number is insignificant, considering the staffing plan envisioned six UAV platoons in each mechanized and rifle battalion, as well as a UAV battalion comprising three companies. However, the brigade did not receive a SINGLE drone from the state to carry out combat missions. Moreover, the soldiers were unable to purchase drones, equipment, or vehicles with their rear-line salaries. As a result, a brigade fully equipped with infantry, artillery, and armored vehicles lacked drones—the primary tools for reconnaissance and control in modern warfare—making it effectively limited in its ability to conduct combat operations. Thanks to the support of volunteers, including my foundation, the brigade managed to deploy no more than 5-6 live streams simultaneously after reaching the front lines, with the main issue being the shortage of trained operators. Ten days after entering combat, the brigade received 17 million hryvnias from the Ministry of Defense to procure a batch of drones.

There was also a complete lack of electronic warfare systems, no time to equip all combat vehicles with reliable grids, and no grids themselves. All this was requested from volunteers, and the Ministry of Defense did not fulfill any requests for drones and electronic warfare. As a result, the brand-new Leopard-2A4 tanks and VAB armored vehicles were damaged by enemy drones during the first attempts to use them at the front. The VAB armored vehicles and AMX-10 tanks were not even serviced upon arrival at the border, causing many technical problems.

The division of the latest 155 mm Caesar self-propelled howitzers (SPHs), as well as the rest of the brigade's artillery and mortar crews, did not have the opportunity to complete a comprehensive firing course and are learning to shoot during combat missions. All 120 mm mortar shells supplied to the brigade, manufactured by the Ministry of Strategic Industries, turned out to be faulty. On December 4, during test firings, not a single one of the 10 shells detonated. The mortars could not provide fire support, and there was no suitable ammunition available to train the mortar crews. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense neither oversees the quality control of mortar supplies to the troops nor removes faulty ammunition from service.

5. Conclusions

Most of the soldiers of the 155th Mechanized Brigade at the front strive to fulfill their duties with integrity. However, due to this criminal neglect of soldiers' lives, the 155th Brigade suffered significant losses from the very first days. There are battalion commanders who lead assaults because there is no one else, and soldiers who fight to the last for every position, performing true acts of heroism from the very beginning—I witnessed this personally near Pokrovsk. People are learning to function as a military unit at the cost of heavy losses. A significant portion of those who have not yet developed a sense of unity with the team continue to go AWOL.

Alongside the 155th, there are experienced units—the 1st "Da Vinci" Assault Battalion, the 25th Airborne Brigade, and the 68th Jaeger Brigade—that face acute infantry shortages and cannot hold a wide front line, however, they have seasoned UAV units, headquarters, and command staff capable of rapidly training and preparing mobilized personnel for combat. Yet, these experienced and combat-ready brigades are not being reinforced with personnel and they are not allowed to stabilize the front. Instead, manpower is allocated to political projects, such as the 155th Brigade, and other newly formed brigades in 2024—the same 14 brigades President Zelenskyy mentioned.

The soldiers of the 155th Brigade have become hostages of Zelenskyy's PR project, which the government has actually treated ineptly and irresponsibly.

We should also mention the military command, which is now trying to hide the truth and use the SBI case to relieve itself of responsibility.

When they were sent to the front, the OC "West" and the CGF initially gave the brigade an "unsatisfactory" rating in the Brigade Capability Assessment Act. But someone put pressure on the top of the Armed Forces leadership, and the generals signed everything and pushed an incapable brigade to the front, giving it a "satisfactory" rating. Colonel Halymskyi of the OC "West", without the consent of the brigade command, drove people to the front, not allowing them to pack their belongings, partly without weapons, which greatly confused the normal organization of the unit's deployment.

Attempts by the command of the OC "West" and the Ground Forces Command to present positive reports to the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief resulted in falsification of reality. Following the dismissal of Brigade Commander Riumshyn, the AFU Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi sought to enhance the combat effectiveness of the 155th Brigade by dispatching a commission to Pokrovsk. The commission consisted of the commander of OC "West," Shvediuk, and the Chief of Staff of OC "West," Seletskyi, who were responsible for the brigade's training. Everything was tense and filled with shouting, as such chaos is the price of the disorder created by our leadership.

On December 30, Colonel Seletskyi died of a heart attack while performing his duties. He cared deeply about the mission, therefore, if we want to save lives and investigate the case of the 155th Brigade to ensure such incidents never happen again, we must not question the dead, the dismissed, or the deceased. Instead, we need to hold accountable those who are alive and well—those who issued such orders and set such unreasonable demands:

- President Zelenskyy, who made unrealistic promises to Macron and did not control the realism of his instructions at all;

- Defence Minister Umierov, who did not pay any attention to how such an important combat brigade was being trained and equipped;

- Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Syrskyi, who sets tasks manually and is unable to organize a planned process of organising, training and using reserves;

- The Commander of the Army, Pavliuk, and the Commander of OC West, Shvediuk, who knew what was happening but blindly followed an inadequate order to send a combat-ineffective unit to the front;

- Minister of Strategic Industry Smetanin, who continues to shamelessly and with impunity supply faulty mines to the front and use budget funds on the blood of Ukrainian soldiers whom Smetanin deprives of ammunition.

There are also many leaders of the OC and CGF who know and see all this, but sign the papers that are required of them, and then soldiers, patriotic and motivated citizens, the best of the best, who see this mess but do their best despite all these difficulties and protect us all, have to pay for these fake reports and acts of capability with their blood.

As a result, people, money, and time were spent to form a brigade that, due to its low combat capability, cannot be employed as a brigade. The 155th fights as an attached unit to specific subunits within the line of other combat-ready units, meaning that money was spent on the brigade, but it is being used as mere marching reinforcement, which any combat-ready brigade would have trained far better and deployed much more effectively.

So why was it formed if it cannot be used as intended? For PR and reports? For a meeting with Macron?

And is it worth it, Messrs. Zelenskyy, Umierov, and Syrskyi, the lives of dozens of people dying near Pokrovsk as part of the 155th, due to basic disorder and poor preparation that stemmed from your mistakes in task setting, planning, and organization?

Will you testify to the SBI investigators about how you led the 155th Brigade to such a state, how you squandered significant funds from our allies and Ukrainian citizens, how, instead of strengthening the front, you disrupted the organization and training of reserves, and undermined the defense of Pokrovsk?

I hope the day will come when you, the true culprits of this situation, will be the first to face justice.

I appeal to civil society: please help spread this story to pressure the authorities into banning the formation of new brigades that lack proper equipment, ending harmful PR-driven projects in the military, and directing all our resources toward reinforcing combat-ready and experienced brigades and battalions.

To find out how the 155th soldiers fight in such conditions, watch the interview with the commander.

The 155th Brigade needs maximum help to save lives.

Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET